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Abstract: Computer role-playing games (RPGs) often include a simulated morality system as a core design element.
Games’ morality systems can include both god’s eye view aspects, in which certain actions are inherently
judged by the simulated world to be good or evil, as well as social simulations, in which non-player characters
(NPCs) react to judgments of the player’s and each others’ activities. Games with a larger amount of social
simulation have clear affinities to multi-agent systems (MAS) research on artificial societies. They differ in a
number of key respects, however, due to a mixture of pragmatic game-design considerations and their typically
strong embeddedness in narrative arcs, resulting in many important aspects of moral systems being represented
using explicitly scripted scenarios rather than through agent-based simulations. In this position paper, we
argue that these similarities and differences make RPGs a promising challenge domain for MAS research,
highlighting features such as moral dilemmas situated in more organic settings than seen in game-theoretic
models of social dilemmas, and heterogeneous representations of morality that use both moral calculus systems
and social simulation. We illustrate some possible approaches using a case study of the morality systems in
the game The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion.
1 INTRODUCTION
Role-playing games (RPGs) are a genre of
videogame in which the player takes on the role of a
character or group of characters and plays out a story
in a virtual world. The story often takes the form of
a series of quests intermixed with more free-form ex-
ploration; the virtual world is typically populated by a
number of computer-controlled characters referred to
as non-player characters (NPCs).1
A common and often prominent feature of RPG
design is the presence of a morality system of some
kind. These vary greatly in how they represent moral-
ity computationally, but in keeping with the high-
fantasy setting of many RPGs, often position char-
acters on a good vs. evil scale. Common features
include: updating characters’ morality as a result of
actions in the game world (killing someone innocent
1There are also tabletop and live-action role-playing
games, but we limit ourselves here to the videogame genre,
especially to the subset sometimes called computer role-
playing games or CRPGs (Barton, 2008).
makes you more evil); modifying gameplay based on
moral alignment (an evil character is shunned or re-
acted to in a hostile manner); and modifying narrative
based on moral alignment (different choices result in
different endings). In some games this can have an
added layer of simulated social complexity, with dif-
ferent groups of NPCs or even individual NPCs mak-
ing their own moral judgments, instead of characters
falling on a universal good/evil alignment.
In addition to forming a core part of the game
mechanics of many RPGs, these representations of
morality can be used to pose dilemmas in which the
player must choose a course of action (Zagal, 2009;
Sicart, 2013). Such dilemmas can be analyzed from
both an “internal ludic” perspective, i.e. in terms of
the game world’s internal representation of morality,
or from an “externalized” perspective, i.e. in terms of
how the dilemma causes the player to reflect on moral
issues in the real world (Heron and Belford, 2014b).
The position we argue in this paper is that the
morality systems designed into role-playing games
are a productive setting for investigating simulated
morality using multi-agent systems (MAS). We mean
this in two directions: that RPGs are a promising
testbed for MAS theories and architectures, and that
RPGs can serve as a potential application domain for
MAS research.
From the description above, it may even sound
like RPGs essentially already have simulations of
morality in artificial societies. A morality system plus
a world populated by NPCs is not too far off the mark
conceptually. However, in practice, RPGs and their
morality systems are designed and implemented in
quite a different manner from the way agents are mod-
eled and studied in MAS research. Videogame de-
signers approach the topic from a pragmatic perspec-
tive, since their goal is to make an entertaining and
coherent experience, and are not necessarily focused
on whether the simulation would make sense from a
scientific or philosophical perspective.
As a result of game designers’ understandable fo-
cus on experience design, NPCs are not usually im-
plemented using agent models from artificial intel-
ligence research, but in simpler architectures with a
good deal more scope for manual specification and
tweaking of behaviors. Moral dilemmas in particu-
lar are usually quite carefully scripted, set up by the
game’s narrative designer, using techniques such as
explicit branching-narrative choice points. Dilemmas
often do involve NPCs that could be seen as agents,
however, and in some cases these agents have an in-
teresting level of social simulation, especially simu-
lation of features such as reputation, i.e. what beliefs
NPCs hold about the player and how the player’s ac-
tions affect those beliefs (Russell, 2006).
In relation to ethical theories, videogames offer-
ing moral choices are usually based on a short-term
consequentialist approach: the moral alignment of the
choices is clear in advance, and the consequences are
foreseen and direct. However, and as Sicart (2013)
points out, games such as Fallout 3 often present the
player with choices that have no clear good or bad
options, and which often have unforeseeable conse-
quences in the long term. In this sense, and quoting
the definition of the Fallout series’ “karma” measure
in Multiple Authors (2005), the morality system in
a game involving this kind of morally-grey choices
measure “not only the effects of your actions but also
your intentions”. As a notorious example of a game
based on a quite different approach, Ultima IV is
based on virtue ethics; as pointed out by Heron and
Belford (2014a), the game requires the player to get
involved in moral reflection regarding their actions.
The modeling of ethical theories in artificial
agents is key in the field of artificial morality, and
Allen et al. (2005) provide an overview of differ-
ent approaches. Whereas consequentialist or deon-
tological approaches seem to be a good fit for artifi-
cial moral agents (although not devoid of challenges),
accounting for a Kantian or intentionalist approach
faces the issue of accessing the agent’s motives, which
some authors argue that an artificial agent may not
even have (Floridi and Sanders, 2004; Wallach et al.,
2010). In contrast, Muntean and Howard (2014) sug-
gest to build an artificial moral agent based on virtue
ethics by using genetic algorithms.
It is possible to treat role-playing games more
fully as multi-agent systems, viewing a game’s NPCs
as a group of simulated agents and the player as a par-
ticipant in the agent society, along the lines of what
Guyot and Honiden (2006) call multi-agent participa-
tory simulations. Using this perspective, we propose
a research path for scaling the agent-based study of
moral systems to the kinds of dilemmas encountered
in role-playing games, which we argue pose both an
interesting challenge and promising domain for sim-
ulation of morality in artificial societies. To make our
argument more concrete, we analyze the morality sys-
tem implemented in the RPG The Elder Scrolls IV:
Oblivion from a MAS perspective.
2 RELATED WORK
There is a good deal of related work in both multi-
agent systems and games; we briefly summarize some
of the most relevant here.
There are a number of general proposals for using
games and game engines as test beds for multi-agent
systems research in various ways (Kaminka et al.,
2002; Bainbridge, 2007; Fabregues and Sierra, 2011;
Koeman et al., 2018; Juliani et al., 2018), as well
as more specific proposals arguing that role-playing
games have useful design principles to offer (Bar-
reteau et al., 2001; Guyot and Honiden, 2006).
One of the most relevant bodies of work on the
MAS side is that which uses multi-agent systems as
an empirical social-science tool to study social dilem-
mas, usually modeled by game-theory-style games
such as the prisoner’s dilemma (see Gotts et al., 2003,
for an extensive survey). Social dilemmas need not
necessarily have a moral interpretation, but often can
easily be read in such terms. Work on the role of
norms as a way of structuring behavior in agent so-
cieties approaches a similar problem with a different
conceptual framework (Boella et al., 2006).
Social simulation research has also studied this
issue, designing multi-agent systems to recreate and
study the behavior of artificial societies formed by ar-
tificial agents. Different experiments study different
properties of such societies, such as the emergence
of altruistic behavior. Surveying such research, one
of the recommendations of Sullins (2005) is: “I think
that the agent-based approach is the correct one but
that the technology we have today is a bit too weak to
simulate the evolution of morality in full. To achieve
this goal will require software agents that have at least
some cognitive capacities”.
Our proposal is that role-playing games as a chal-
lenge domain pose questions about how to scale up
this type of multi-agent systems research to a set-
ting that has features not found in simpler game-
theoric games and more “flat” simulations. For ex-
ample: sequences of heterogeneous events over time,
taking place in various locations with a variety of
types of agents, situated within larger-scale narratives
that structure behavior and interpretation of behav-
ior. Nonetheless, RPGs do retain some advantages for
computational investigation, since they are still self-
contained virtual worlds.
From the game-research side, there is recent work
on social-simulation systems for games, which aims
to build frameworks in which games with multiple
NPCs can be designed more heavily around simu-
lation and agent-based (instead of scripted) ways of
representing social interactions (McCoy et al., 2011;
Samuel et al., 2015; Guimaraes et al., 2017). This
work doesn’t usually frame itself as representing
morality, but as with agent-based social-simulation
work, such architectures are likely to be quite appli-
cable to the case of morality systems as well.
3 GAMES AND ARTIFICIAL
AGENTS
Following the line set by those previously cited
works that push forward in the direction of consider-
ing virtual worlds in videogames as complex simula-
tions, there are two main topics in which researchers
in MAS could benefit from the latest advances in such
games, as well as the other way around.
3.1 Dilemmas and Games
The field of game theory studies the behavior of mul-
tiple agents with regards to a set of decisions that of-
ten involve some notion of positive or negative pay-
offs. Although these studies are meant to be used
to predict the behavior that real-world agents would
have in a similar situation, they often assume that the
participants are perfect rational agents, meaning that
their decisions will always correspond to their best
possible choice in terms of outcomes; needless to say,
in real-world case scenarios the actual agents are of-
ten not as rational as one would like them to be, and
the situations are often more complex and messier to
model. Even though studies such as those of Baltag
et al. (2009) aim to cover this gap, there is still a sig-
nificant gap between realistic modeling of societies
and game-theoretic social models.
In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, the individ-
ually rational solution is to defect, even though it’s in
the players’ overall best interests to cooperate. Some
studies (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, e.g.) suggest
that in the case of human agents there is in fact a bias
towards cooperation. What makes this dilemma inter-
esting in relation to videogames is that there is a set of
titles belonging to the Zero Escape series (first devel-
oped by Spike Chunsoft, and later by Chime), such as
Zero Escape: Virtue’s Last Reward, that include mod-
ified versions of the prisoner’s dilemma as one of the
core mechanics of their gameplay.
When videogames have adapted the prisoner’s
dilemma as a gameplay mechanic, their participants
are explicitly not meant to be neutral, fully-rational
agents, but rather complex characters with different
personality traits, goals and motivations that greatly
affect how the dilemma should be faced. In this
case, the approach of such videogames to the clas-
sic dilemma opens up a new dimension that goes be-
yond the notions of rationality (in addition to being
less symmetric, as agents are no longer assumed to be
equivalent) and which demands a more “organic” ap-
proach that takes into account character traits, goals
and moral values of the particular agents involved in
it. These examples are based on scripted narratives
and do not properly belong to the RPG genre, but
they already begin to illustrate some of the features
that videogame versions of moral dilemmas typically
add, such as consideration of differing goals, values
and characters’ relationships into any evaluation, and
which may be of interest for research in MAS.
Along a similar line, experiments using the well-
known trolley problem (as in Foot (1978), among
many others), which is often framed as a dilemma
for the utilitarian ethical system, suggests that ratio-
nal notions of the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber are usually not enough to reach a consensus re-
garding the right choice. This particular dilemma has
become particularly relevant lately due to the grow-
ing advancements in self-driving vehicles. Awad et al.
(2018) conducted a survey study on a wide number of
human participants to determine how the particulari-
ties of the agents involved in the dilemma affect the
way people choose the preferred solution. The study
illustrates how a great deal of factors, such as the age,
gender, profession or background of the subjects in-
volved affect decisions. These effects, therefore, are
not based on a rational, game-theoretic reasoning, but
rather on other factors such as feelings, values and
prejudices. Drawing an analogy with the prisoner’s
dilemma case, we argue that a study of such cases us-
ing simulations including deeper and more complex
agents, such as those modeled in RPGs, can be ben-
eficial for understanding all the dimensions involved
in making a decision on this kind of scenario.
3.2 Artificial Societies and Games
A purpose of simulated artificial societies is to model
fundamental qualities of living systems through com-
puter models based on agents. These computer mod-
els can be used to study emergent behaviors among
the agents inhabiting an artificial society. Sugarscape,
for instance, was used to study the emergence of
social groups through interactions between simple
agents and their environment (Epstein and Axtell,
1996). Although this experiment starts with very sim-
ple grounding rules, the model showed the emergence
of certain interesting behaviors, such as group migra-
tion behaviors, or the formation of different “tribes”
that would compete for the dominance of particularly
resource-rich areas.
Other models, such as the one created by Pepper
and Smuts (2000), explore the emergence of altruis-
tic behavior and group formation. Furthermore, the
NEW TIES Project aimed to model an artificial en-
vironment in which artificial agents could evolve lan-
guage, society and even some understanding of their
own existence (Eiben et al., 2008). Although it was
not intended in the project, Sullins (2005) argues that
a complex model such as this one could be used to
study the emergence of morality in a social environ-
ment.
The computational study of emergent behavior in
social dynamics, nevertheless, often is based on sim-
ulating artificial societies formed by agents fulfilling
a restricted set of roles—precisely because the inter-
est in most of those works is to study the emergence
of behaviors that are not initially modeled within the
agents or the environment. Such restrictions, by de-
sign, do not account for more organic forms of social
relationships, e.g., moral judgments, or even for the
particular roles of certain agents in building and main-
taining those artificial societies. These kind of rela-
tionships would need to take into account things such
as the affinity that agents have towards each other,
their unique attributes as individual agents, and the
set of possible actions they can enact in their artificial
society.
Conversely, videogames often present the player
with a highly interactive virtual world in which agents
inhabiting them show compelling and complex be-
haviors and contribute towards depicting a believable
human-like society, though these systems are often
designed top-down rather than simulated bottom-up,
i.e. with directly represented high-level structure in-
stead of emergent structure. As the technologies be-
hind games have grown more and more powerful,
those virtual worlds have nonetheless begun to ac-
count for complex behaviors of their inhabitants such
as their day and night schedules, needs (such as eating
or sleeping), goals, and similar high-level features of
human agency: some of those virtual worlds are pop-
ulated by agents that wake up in the morning, eat, go
to work, socialize in a tavern, go back to sleep and
who, under certain conditions, may even decide to
disobey the law in order to fulfill some of their needs
(see “Responsibility” in Multiple Authors, 2008).
Even though any simulated aspects of virtual
worlds in videogames aim, ultimately, at the enter-
tainment of the player rather than at simulational fi-
delity, the level of detail in which their inhabitants are
created represents a valuable step forward in terms
of modeling agents that are part of a virtual society.
Considering this, we argue that researchers in MAS
can benefit from considering some of the richest cases
of artificial societies currently existing in videogames
and more specifically in some RPGs.
Titles based on a sandbox style of virtual world
provide a bridge that is closer to MAS work, while il-
lustrating some of the videogame features elaborated
in RPGs. One well-known example is Lionhead’s
Black & White (Molyneux, 2001), which implements
a simulation of moral choices and the emergence of
moral values as the game’s core mechanic. The player
assumes the role of a god in a newly created world,
populated initially by simple agents living in there.
As a god, the player’s influence over the world is me-
diated through the use of powers to shape the terrain
or affect the weather as well as through a kind of emis-
sary, which takes the form of a giant creature that also
roams around the world. That creature has its own
needs as well, and may decide, when it feels hungry,
to eat one of the inhabitants from the world. As its
master, the player can decide to either punish or re-
ward such behavior, thus reinforcing the creature to
do it again, or preventing it from repeating such ac-
tion. The feedback given by the player contributes to
the evolution not only of the moral profile of the emis-
sary, but also of the way the inhabitants in the world
are going to regard the player: if the player is helpful
and kind, their inhabitants will pay their respects and
love both the emissary and the player; if the player is
a merciless, evil god, the inhabitants will fear them
both. In this case, both the emergence of a moral
system in a particular agent (the emissary) and their
effects on a society are the driving mechanics of the
game, which reinforces the claim that, nowadays, cer-
tain open-world games depicting complex societies
can be of great interest for the computational study
of moral emergence.
Another example can be found in the game se-
ries Creatures by Mindscape Inc. (Grand and Cliff,
1998), where the player assumes a similar role to the
god in Black & White, but selectively breeds creatures
in a closed habitat, to foster certain traits. Similar to
Black & White, creatures can be trained using rein-
forcement, but because there are multiple intelligent
agents acting and interacting in Creatures, players can
reward or punish social interaction between agents.
Creatures moves closer to artificial life (ALife) sim-
ulation, as the game does not feature a story-driven
plot, but acts more like a virtual fishtank or ant colony,
where the player entertains him or herself through ob-
serving changes in the environment and agents.
The evolution of agents in games is limited, and
the ways used to govern how agents behave varies; in
the case of Black & White, the inhabitants are con-
trolled by a scripted system, while the player’s emis-
sary is controlled by a neural network. For Creatures,
the agents are controlled by a rule-based system and
they evolve through breeding artificial chromosomes.
Even if some features of these agents are restricted
due to performance constraints for the game, we be-
lieve that, with relatively few additions, virtual worlds
such as these may be useful to study the evolution
of moral behaviors in an artificial society, and there-
fore we claim that this approach can lead to interest-
ing contributions to both the MAS and the soft AL-
ife fields. The best examples of fully realized moral-
ity systems in videogames, however, can be found in
RPGs, which we’ll turn to now.
4 CASE STUDY: OBLIVION
The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion (called just Obliv-
ion henceforth) is a computer RPG that takes place
within a richly simulated social and cultural world
(Champion, 2009). Its social world simulation com-
bined with frequent references to moral aspects of
actions presents one of the more complex existing
cases of a game morality system with a strong role
for virtual agents in forming and enacting moral judg-
ments. Figure 1 summarizes key elements of the
game’s morality system, which we’ve produced as
part of a larger research project analyzing how dif-
ferent RPGs implement morality systems.2
Even though the game is still mainly focused on
the players’ experience, and so the Player Character
(PC) takes a more relevant role in the model, we can
see how the NPCs are still related through all other
agents via a Disposition attribute that accounts for
how their relationship is. This disposition, in case of
the relationship between the PC and the NPCs, is af-
fected by the overall measurement of the PC’s “good”
and “bad” deeds, which are represented through the
Fame and Infamy properties. Aside from those, both
the NPCs and the PC have different attributes detail-
ing not only their physical and psychical strengths and
weaknesses, but also detailing a set of skills in which
they are proficient. This, in turn, determines what
kind of activities each NPC can carry out in the game,
and which it cannot. Furthermore, we can also see in
the model how allegiance to certain factions or social
groups is also taken into account when determining
the affinity between agents.
One of the more unique features of the way Obliv-
ion models NPCs, and which is particularly relevant
when considering morality in artificial societies, is
the attribute of Responsibility. In short, this attribute
represents how the NPC feels towards the existing
law in the virtual world. Unlike many other RPG
games with complex NPCs, Oblivion goes one step
beyond and allows NPCs with low responsibility to
(non-scriptedly) choose goal achievement over law-
fulness. For example, if an NPC has a low responsi-
bility score, needs food, and currently lacks anything
to eat, it may steal it from a market stall. This dif-
fers from many games, in which only the player and
specifically scripted “evil” characters have the pos-
sibility to violate norms in a way that the in-game
morality system would judge as a violation, which it
a step closer towards a simulation of moral calculus
and behavior in an agent society.
In fact, not only will NPCs in Oblivion make such
decisions regardless of whether the player could no-
tice the behavior or not, but if they do commit im-
moral acts, they risk facing the same consequences
as the PC would, if they are caught while committing
a crime by a guard or by another NPC. In particu-
lar, if the NPC is caught while committing a crime,
the guards will give it a chance to pay a bounty; if
the NPC cannot afford it (which it normally will not
be able to), then the guards will execute the NPC.
The NPC’s responsibility is also taken into account
when determining whether, when witnessing an ille-
gal activity, one NPC will care enough to report the
other one to the guards; NPCs with low responsibil-
2We’ve gathered some details of how Oblivion is imple-
mented from the UESP wiki (Multiple Authors, 2008).
Figure 1: Diagram summarizing the operation of the morality systems in The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion, viewed from an
agent-centric perspective.
ity, for instance, will not be bothered when witnessing
a crime, while NPCs with high responsibility will im-
mediately call the guards, or even confront the crimi-
nal.
So, as it currently is, Oblivion models a virtual
society with virtual agents that account for:
1. Day and night schedules and plans, with particular
goals and needs.
2. Different physical and psychical attributes.
3. Different sets of skills that allow them to engage
in some activities, while limiting others.
4. Their responsibility towards the virtual society’s
laws, which affect their reaction to illegal activi-
ties, as well as allowing them to engage in those.
5. A disposition attribute modeling a distinct rela-
tionship with every other artificial agent.
6. A social dimension accounting for the NPC be-
longing to particular groups or factions, which po-
tentially affect their relationship with NPCs from
other factions.
The major difference in this case, regarding its re-
lation to MAS, lies in the fact that the game is player-
centered: therefore, and even though NPCs show a
great deal of complexity in their model and behav-
ior, their properties are only dynamic in terms of their
relationship towards the player. In other words, al-
though each NPC has a disposition value towards
each other, or a responsibility value on their own,
those properties do not change over time: the disposi-
tion of an NPC only varies in its relationship towards
the PC, and the NPC’s responsibility is set right from
the beginning, meaning that the moral behavior of the
NPC is constant throughout the game, without the
possibility of changing. Similarly, and even though
the PC accounts for the Fame and Infamy derived
from performing morally good or morally bad deeds,
NPCs do not have such scales. However, the model
could be easily adapted to account for that in the same
way it already does for the PC’s case. This makes
sense when considering that this particular model, in
the end, is a means to provide a believable environ-
ment for a single-player game experience.
Nevertheless, we argue that this model of NPCs,
taking into account the complexity of their attributes,
their relationship with each other and their moral pro-
files, could very well be used to simulate a virtual
world populated by virtual agents accounting for all
those properties in a dynamic way, thus being able to
evolve and adapt to their interactions. Furthermore,
the fact that NPCs already have a particular skill set in
the current model would allow to account for different
roles that different agents could play or different con-
tributions they could make in the creation and evolu-
tion of the virtual society. This could be used both to
simulate a “self-driving” artificial society, populated
only by NPCs following their own behaviors, or to
keep the figure of the player involved in this artificial
society as a participant in the agent society, as Guyot
and Honiden (2006) propose. By allowing the artifi-
cial agents to evolve and adapt, the model represented
in this game can be used to create more organic ar-
tificial societies that could be used both to study the
emergence of moral behaviors by MAS researchers,
and to simulate worlds exhibiting a greater level of
detail in terms of social dynamics for RPGs.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Role-playing games offer a novel view on artifi-
cial morality in simulated societies situated in rich
environments. They often feature designed moral-
ity systems that have enough parallels to multi-agent
systems work to make borrowing of techniques in
both directions plausible (and, we argue, promising),
but also differ in enough ways to pose research chal-
lenges. A few differences include the interplay of
character-level simulation and god’s-eye moral calcu-
lus, and especially the way that both of these simu-
lated elements are combined with pre-scripted com-
ponents and manually designed moral dilemmas that
designers use to capture aspects that they find diffi-
cult to do through a fully agent-based approach. In
general, one could characterize RPGs as a more het-
erogeneous and “messy” domain than those studied in
scientific agent-based research. They therefore pro-
vide a complex and interesting challenge domain for
research on multi-agent systems.
We have argued how cross-disciplinary research
in the areas of MAS and artificial societies using
RPGs can be greatly beneficial for future projects on
morality, both when studied as particular dilemma-
like cases and for their emergent behaviors in social
simulations. MAS can benefit from the organic set-
ting of dilemmas that videogames can offer; artificial
society research can benefit from complex and more
dynamic models of agents that are often depicted in
RPGs. At the same time, the complex worlds and so-
cial settings simulated in RPGs can benefit from ad-
vances in modeling emergent social behaviors in arti-
ficial societies to achieve greater levels of immersion.
Finally, we hope that our analysis of a particular case
study, the morality system of The Elder Scrolls IV:
Oblivion, has illustrated some possible directions for
combining the kind of modeling and systems design
done in RPGs with work in artificial societies.
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